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IMPROVING THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS
THROUGH DECRIMINALIZATION∗ 
“The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that 
if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 
still be done.”1  The constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel in criminal prosecutions is one of the many safeguards 
contained within the Sixth Amendment designed to protect the 
fundamental human rights of life and liberty.2  Unfortunately, for 
indigent defendants that safeguard of life and liberty operates as 
a mere platitude today.  Stephen Bright, founder of the Southern 
Center for Human Rights, has bleakly summarized the crisis of 
indigent defense, noting that while the right to counsel is widely 
celebrated, it is not actually observed with equal force.3 
Over the past half-century, the right to counsel has been 
greatly expanded and solidified doctrinally.4  Two guiding 
principles stand at the foreground of that expansion.  First, the 
right to counsel provides that if an individual is too poor to afford 
his own defense, the state must furnish a lawyer to represent him.5  
Second, the right to counsel includes the right to effective 
assistance – not just the presence of an individual who happens to 
be a lawyer standing alongside the accused.6  Unfortunately, 
while the Supreme Court has repeatedly stood in strong defense 
of the right to counsel and expounded on its vitality to the criminal 
        ∗ The author thanks Jordan Blair Woods, Assistant Professor of Law, University of 
Arkansas School of Law, for his assistance as an invaluable and unending well of knowledge, 
criticism, insight, and inspiration. The author also thanks his wife Caitlin Altman for her 
patience, support, and encouragement during this process. 
1. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. See id.
3. Stephen B. Bright, Turning Celebrated Principles Into Reality, THE CHAMPION,
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 6, http://library.law.yale.edu /sites /default /files/ turning _principles _into 
_reality__gideon_at_40_-_champion.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TEC-9C52] (“No constitutional 
right is celebrated so much in the abstract and observed so little in reality as the right to 
counsel.”). 
4. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
5. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
6. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-86.
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justice system and the necessity of a fair trial,7 the promises of 
Gideon and Strickland have disappointingly gone unfulfilled.8 
The problem is easy to identify.  Public defenders are 
perpetually forced to deal with unmanageable caseloads far 
exceeding professional guidelines.9  Gideon’s promise has gone 
unrealized for over half a century because public defenders have 
persistently been crippled in their pursuit of justice due to 
tremendous caseloads and funding deficits.10  The never-ending 
inadequacies of public defense has led some scholars to somberly 
describe criminal defense in the United States as being in a 
“permanent state of crisis.”11  The most troubling aspect of this 
permanent crisis is that the problem could not be any more salient. 
Since Gideon was decided, at least one major independent report 
has been released every five years documenting the inadequacies 
of indigent defense.12 
Despite the overwhelming evidence of the state of crisis in 
which indigent defense finds itself in year after year, state 
legislatures have been largely unresponsive to repeated pleas 
from both public defenders and legal scholars for increased 
funding.13  Public defenders suffer from excessive caseloads and 
insufficient resources.14  If the public refuses to help our 
defenders on the back-end through increased funding, the 
alternative is to reduce caseloads on the front-end of the criminal 
7.  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45; Powell 
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
8.  See Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent 
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2063-64 (2000) [hereinafter Gideon’s Promise]. 
9. Id.
10. Anthony C. Thompson, The Promise of Gideon: Providing High-Quality Public
Defense in America, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 713, 713-14 (2013). 
11. Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an “Ex Ante”
Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 246 (1997); Mary Sue Backus & Paul 
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 
1045 (2006) (“By every measure in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system, 
the defense function for poor people is drastically underfinanced.”). 
12. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 64 (1999); see also Gideon’s Promise, supra note 8, at 2064; 
Thompson, supra note 10, at 723. 
13. See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 430 (2009); Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of 
Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 465 (2007) (noting that for 
years, indigent defense advocates have pled for more funding, but “those pleas [have] fallen 
on deaf ears”). 
14. Hashimoto, supra note 13, at 465.
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justice system.15  Any conversation about defense caseloads 
should focus on the misdemeanor dockets.  In 2009, the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NADL”) issued a 
report that estimated approximately 10.5 million misdemeanor 
prosecutions occur annually.16  Misdemeanors make up 
approximately 80% of most state dockets, and the typical 
encounter between the average American and the criminal justice 
system is through the misdemeanor gateway.17  According to data 
collected by the Court Statistics Project, for 2015, thirty-three 
states and the District of Columbia reported data consistent with 
NADL’s estimation in 2009.18  Decriminalization of certain 
misdemeanors has been recognized as a way to lower defender 
caseloads and save defender offices millions of dollars.19 
Public defender caseloads are currently over-inflated with 
low-level, non-violent crimes, so decriminalizing certain 
misdemeanors would effectively reduce the caseloads of public 
defenders, allowing them to actually provide their remaining 
clients with the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the 
constitution.20  Two offenses are prime candidates for such 
decriminalization efforts: driving with a suspended license and 
marijuana offenses.  By removing marijuana offenses and driving 
with a suspended license from criminal dockets, public defenders 
15. Contra id. (arguing that the solution to the indigent defense crisis is to reduce the
right to counsel for misdemeanor offenses allowing defenders to focus their efforts on their 
felony clients where defenders can be more effective). 
16. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE 
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), https:// www. 
nacdl.org/ criminal defense.aspx?id=20188&libID=20158 [https://perma.cc/7L7V-M26V] 
[hereinafter MINOR CRIMES]. 
17. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1063 (2015). 
18. See Court Statistics Project, 2015 Criminal Caseloads – Trial Courts,
http://www.ncsc.org /Sitecore /Content /Microsites /PopUp /Home /CSP /CSP_ Criminal 
[https://perma.cc/D79C-5VPL] (Select data year “2015”; then select chart/table “Statewide 
Misdem. Caseloads and Rates”; Do not select an individual state) (The thirty-four 
jurisdictions reported around 9.5 million misdemeanors out of over 12 million total crimes. 
Of these reporting jurisdictions, misdemeanors made up a collective 77% of all crimes in 
these jurisdictions). 
19. Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1073.
20. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in
the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 294 (2011) (“Although excessive 
workloads are cause for concern in both the felony and misdemeanor context, individuals 
facing misdemeanor charges are more likely to suffer the consequences of the workload 
strain.”). 
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will have more time and resources to allocate to their remaining 
clients, getting the nation one step closer to honoring the demands 
of the Sixth Amendment so that justice can “still be done.” 
Part I of this comment will briefly summarize the current 
state of indigent defense.  Part II will briefly summarize the 
different strategies of decriminalization and their respective 
strengths and weaknesses.  Part III will explain why marijuana 
charges and driving with a suspended license are prime 
candidates for decriminalization.  Finally, Part IV will discuss 
what policy makers should be mindful of when undertaking 
decriminalization efforts. 
I.  THE CURRENT STATE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE 
Even well before Gideon guaranteed the right to counsel to 
indigent defendants, Justice Hugo Black simply stated, “[t]here 
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends 
on the amount of money he has.”21  Even after Gideon’s mandate, 
there has been no shortage of legal critics lamenting that the 
structural inadequacies of public defense in America have 
continued to negatively impact indigent defendants.22  Excessive 
caseloads severely limit a public defender’s capabilities resulting 
in representation that is neither competent nor diligent.23  As long 
as public defenders are crippled by unmanageable caseloads, they 
will be systemically incapable of providing the same level of 
service that would be expected of private counsel, and Justice 
Black’s warning will be forgotten and obsolete.24 
The right to counsel has continued along a parabolic 
trajectory, expanding on an upward trajectory providing 
protections for more and more Americans before being caught 
and slowly pulled back down to a more limited function.  First, 
the United States Supreme Court held in Powell v. Alabama25 that 
21. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
22.  See generally Thompson, supra note 10; Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like 
Sisyphus: Can Defense Counsel Overcome Pervasive Status Quo Bias in the Criminal Justice 
System?, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 315, 316-19 (2012); Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About 
Gideon: The Next Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1309, 1331 (2013). 
23. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN
PUBLIC DEFENSE 6 (2011). 
24. See id. at 6-7.
25. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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under limited circumstances, the appointment of counsel for 
indigent defendants in a capital case was required under the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26  Thirty years 
later, Justice Black’s admonition against treating indigents 
separately in the criminal law context was heeded, and Gideon 
extended the holding of Powell, this time finding a constitutional 
mandate in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, incorporating 
the indigent’s right to counsel for felony cases.27  The scope of 
the right to counsel continued to expand, covering a multitude of 
situations such as juvenile delinquency proceedings28 or a first 
direct appeal of a conviction.29  Ultimately, the right to counsel 
reached its peak when the Supreme Court declared that the right 
to be represented by counsel expanded to all criminal cases 
resulting in imprisonment and the loss of liberty, including 
misdemeanors.30  However, the right to counsel has subsequently 
been undermined, reducing the impetus for states to honor the 
constitutional mandate.31  Currently, for the right to counsel to 
attach, there must be “actual imprisonment” rather than “the mere 
threat of imprisonment.”32  This means that the right to counsel 
26. Id. at 71 (limiting the right to be appointed counsel to indigents in capital cases
who are ignorant, feeble-minded, illiterate, or the like). 
27. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
28. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967).
29. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
30. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37 (1972); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654,
658 (2002) (holding that the right to counsel applies even where a defendant is given a 
suspended sentence subject to revocation because the revocation would result in 
imprisonment).  It is important to note that the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases is often 
not respected, and many misdemeanants end up being prosecuted without ever being offered 
the ability to exercise their constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.  Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1341-43 (2012); Roberts, supra note 20, 
at 311-12.  One of the most outrageous refusals to recognize the right to counsel in 
misdemeanor cases is found in the words of Chief Justice Jean Hoefer Toal of the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina, who stated publicly at a meeting of the State Bar:  
“Alabama v. Shelton [is] one of the more misguided decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, I must say. If we adhered to it in South Carolina we would have the right to counsel 
probably . . . by dragooning lawyers out of their law offices to take these cases in every 
magistrate’s court in South Carolina, and I have simply told my magistrates that we just don’t 
have the resources to do that. So I will tell you straight up we [are] not adhering to Alabama 
v. Shelton in every situation.” MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 15, n.35 (alterations in
original). 
31.  See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1066 
(2013). 
32. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that just because a crime
may be punishable by fine and/or imprisonment, the defendant is not entitled to counsel 
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can be ignored if the court and prosecution are willing to forego 
the option of imprisonment for an offense.33  While the “actual 
imprisonment” doctrine has its critics, the truly fatal blows to the 
right to counsel have arisen in the effective assistance of counsel 
line of cases.34  In Powell and Gideon, the Court discussed the 
vital role of defense counsel with lofty language eloquently 
defending the necessity of counsel for indigents, but Strickland 
undermined the aspirations of Powell and Gideon by creating a 
disparagingly low bar for attorney competence.35  The result is 
the right to the assistance of an attorney without a meaningful way 
to measure if the presence of the attorney actually impacted the 
process for the defendant in any manner.36 
With these general principles in mind, I can now turn to the 
actual state of crisis indigent defense finds itself in year after year. 
As noted above, there is no shortage of legal scholars or 
independent reports documenting the problem of overburdened 
public defenders, so an in-depth discussion of such reports here 
would add little to the growing conversation.37  Instead, it would 
be more useful for the purposes of this comment to reserve the 
discussion to three factors shaping indigent defense: (1) 
misdemeanor dockets across the nation have exploded, resulting 
in reduced efficiency of public defenders; (2) legislatures and the 
political process as a whole are largely unresponsive to repeated 
pleas for increased funding; and (3) structural lawsuits are 
ineffective and unreliable means of forcing states to increase 
indigent defense spending. 
unless imprisonment is being sought by the state or will certainly result from the conviction). 
But see Paul Marcus, Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some (but not a lot) of the 
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 149-51 
(2009) (detailing how some jurisdictions go beyond the “actual imprisonment” standard and 
provide the right to counsel to a much broader scope of criminal cases than that required 
under the federal constitution). 
33. Roberts, supra note 20, at 311.
34. See infra Part I.B.3 and accompanying footnotes discussing Strickland.
35. Natapoff, supra note 31, 1066 (“‘Strickland skepticism,’ the conclusion that
Strickland’s low bar for attorney competence has effectively gutted the substantive right to 
counsel . . . . ”). 
36. See Roberts, supra note 20, at 315 (“[T]he Strickland test offers little concrete
guidance to lower courts analyzing actual claims of ineffective assistance and to defense 
attorneys regulated by its Sixth Amendment holding.”). 
37. For an updated list of different independent publications discussing indigent
defense, visit https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=20188&libID =20158 
[https://perma.cc/NR8V-YVSV]. 
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A.  Misdemeanor Caseloads 
For the past couple of decades, the widely accepted 
professional standard for caseload limits for a full-time public 
defender has been 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile 
cases, 200 mental health cases, or 25 appeals per year.38  
However, misdemeanor defenders across the nation repeatedly 
handle caseloads in extreme excess of the guidelines.39  The most 
notorious example is the New Orleans Public Defender Office, 
which reported that its attorneys handle approximately 19,000 
cases per year, greater than forty-seven times the recommended 
amount, which only allows the attorneys to spend a total of seven 
minutes per case.40  Public Defenders in Minnesota have reported 
only having an average of twelve minutes per client to handle 
each case in court, which does not allow for any additional 
research or other paperwork on behalf of the defender.41  While 
the situations in New Orleans and Minnesota are far worse than 
the rest of the nation, those jurisdictions are not alone, as several 
other offices also reported annual misdemeanor caseloads of up 
to 3,000.42 
The amount of misdemeanor cases in the United States is 
staggering.  Estimates show that approximately 2 million felony 
cases are filed each year compared to 10 million misdemeanor 
cases.43  At first glance, one might suggest that misdemeanors 
should of course be much more common than felonies because 
most Americans are not dangerous criminals, and only the worst 
behavior is reserved for designation as felonious.  However, the 
38. MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 21. Also, it is important to note that the
guidelines themselves might be too high because the guidelines assume that the defender is 
a full-time litigator and that the defender works in close proximity to the courthouse.  
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Jessica Mador, A Public Defender’s Day: 12 Minutes Per Client, MINN. PUB. 
RADIO (Nov. 29, 2010), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010 /11/29/public-
defenders [https://perma.cc/H7N9-A398]. 
42. Id.; see also Maureen Dimino, Misdemeanor Courts Are in Need of Repair,
CHAMPION, June 2009, at 36, 39 (summarizing survey data of public defender misdemeanor 
caseloads as follows: 2,000 misdemeanors per year in Chicago, Atlanta, and Miami; 1,200 
in Dallas; 1,500-3,000 in Tennessee; 2,500 in Utah; 927 in Grant County, Washington); 
Roberts, supra note 20, at 279-80 (noting contract defense attorneys in Detroit, Michigan 
average 2,400 to 2,800 misdemeanors a year, an amount in excess of the standard guideline 
by 500%). 
43. See Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1063.
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more accurate answer is likely that the process of 
overcriminalization has caused the number of misdemeanor 
offenses to skyrocket. 
Overcriminalization is the process of the state 
inappropriately abusing the power to impose criminal sanctions 
on conduct that does not rise to the level of harmfulness or 
culpability warranting such sanctions.44  There are many separate 
factors fueling overcriminalization.  First, the political process 
forces politicians to appear “tough on crime” by moving to 
expand the penal code on claims that such actions will reduce 
overall crime and deter other illegal behavior.45  Second, the 
rhetoric surrounding this “tough on crime” stance has essentially 
eroded the harm principle, so it is only getting easier to continue 
to capture more and more behavior under the umbrella of the 
penal law.46  Third, law enforcement is incentivized to enforce 
minor crimes in order to build their record and seek professional 
advancement.47  Lastly, the judiciary has failed to check 
overcriminalization for multiple reasons, including “the anxiety 
of appearing to be a Lochner-esque super-legislature . . . .”48  The 
result is criminal codes that are both overly broad, criminalizing 
a wide range of behavior, and overly deep, providing for criminal 
liability for the same action several times over under multiple 
different statutes.49 
Behavior that was traditionally viewed as “undesirable” or 
“poor manners” has increasingly been removed from the realm of 
44. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 713-16
(2005) (noting that the decision to label behavior as criminal is to make “a critical moral 
judgment” about conduct and the perpetrator, and the ability for the state to deprive an 
individual of his liberty, along with collateral consequences, is a remedy not found in any 
other area of the law); see also Douglas Husak, Reservations About Overcriminalization, 14 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 97, 100-02 (2011) (arguing punishments under the criminal law are 
unique from other sanctions under the law because they contain an expressive element 
“designed to censure and to stigmatize” the offender). 
45. Luna, supra note 44, at 718-20.
46. See id. at 718, 720.
47. Id. at 723-24 (“Although law enforcers are generally charged to ‘do justice,’ they 
are not neutral and detached entities within the legal system, wholly indifferent to outcomes 
in particular cases or net results over time. Like all other professionals, police and 
prosecutors seek the personal esteem and promotion that accompany success, typically 
measured by the number of arrests for the former and convictions for the latter.”). 
48. Id. at 724.
49. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 512-19 (2001). 
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social norms into the criminal sphere.50  The plethora of “criminal 
behavior” that legislative bodies have felt compelled to attach 
criminal sanctions to includes: unleashed pets, failure to use a 
seatbelt, putting one’s feet up on a subway seat, lying across or 
otherwise taking up two subway seats, riding bicycles on 
sidewalks, sleeping in a cardboard box, and even feeding the 
homeless.51 
In 2011, the New York City courts were clogged with more 
than 20,000 arraignments for “theft of services,” which is 
commonly charged for turnstile jumping.52  Around the country, 
defender offices report that petty, nonviolent offenses such as 
public drunkenness, obstructing a walkway, or driving without a 
license are frequently charged and eat up much of the defenders’ 
time.53  Overcriminalization is problematic because it actually 
creates crimes rather than merely acknowledging certain, already 
recognized as morally blameworthy, behavior as criminal. 54 
The expansion of the substantive scope of criminal codes is 
only half of the story.  It is actually police and prosecutors who 
decide to what extent any given law is enforced.55  In New York 
City, 20,000 individuals were not arraigned because turnstile 
jumping was a crime – they were arraigned because a police 
50. See MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 25.
51. Id. For an excellent survey of city ordinances aimed at making the act of being
homeless a crime, including ordinances making it a misdemeanor to sit down in certain 
public places, see NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE 
PLACE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 16-29 (2015), 
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place [https://perma.cc/7XN2-6JPT]. 
52. CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ANNUAL REPORT 30 (2011),
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/criminal/annualreport2011/pdf. [https://perma.cc / 4C 
Y M – V 94Q]. 
53. See THOMAS GIOVANNI & ROOPAL PATEL, GIDEON AT 50: THREE REFORMS TO
REVIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 5 (2013), http:// www.brennancenter.org/ sites/ default 
/files /publications /Gideon_Report_040913.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2EU-YPJR]. 
54. Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 537, 538-39 (2012) (“In addition to the ever-expanding number of criminal 
statutes, standard critiques of overcriminalization also bemoan the broad scope of modern 
criminal codes.  Contemporary criminal codes reach conduct that, in previous generations, 
would not have been subject to punishment.  The classic example is so-called regulatory 
offenses.  These offenses punish conduct that is mala prohibita, or wrongful only because it 
is illegal, and may allow punishment where ‘consciousness of wrongdoing be totally 
wanting.’  With the proliferation of regulatory offenses, infractions that in prior generations 
might not even have resulted in civil fines or tort liability are now subject to the punishment 
and stigma of the criminal law.”). 
55. Stuntz, supra note 49, at 521 (“Legislators speak, but police and prosecutors
control the volume.”). 
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officer arrested them, and a prosecutor proceeded with the 
prosecution.56  Police officers appreciate the broadening of 
criminal codes because “quality of life” offenses, crimes focused 
at low-level street behavior, reduce the investigative burden on 
officers before they may conduct searches and arrests on the 
street.57  Prosecutors are motivated to work efficiently and 
produce high conviction rates, and the broadening of the criminal 
law allows prosecutors to meet those goals.58  
Overcriminalization creates new crimes and overlapping crimes 
that allow for charge-stacking which in turn greatly enhances a 
prosecutor’s bargaining ability when negotiating pleas, which 
produces more convictions at a substantially diminished cost.59 
The result is excessive caseloads that have given rise to a 
practice referred to as “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” where a 
defender’s only communication with a client is often a hurried 
conversation only a few minutes before a court appearance.60  The 
sheer speed through which misdemeanor courts must operate 
given the voluminous caseloads has also been described as “[an] 
‘assembly line,’ ‘cattle-herding,’ and ‘McJustice’ . . . .”61  A 
counter-argument might be made that a petty offense does not 
require a sophisticated legal defense, so a public defender does 
not need a large swath of time to devote to misdemeanor cases; 
however, the problem arises on the systemic level because as long 
as a case is active, a defender still has to attend arraignments and 
other hearings and file and argue various motions.62  Non-violent, 
low-level offenses clog the criminal justice system and distract 
public defender resources from more serious crimes.63 
56. James C. McKinley Jr., For Manhattan Fare Beaters, One-Way Ticket to Court
May Be Over, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/nyregion/ 
subway-fare-beating-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/J5S5-5MZ9]. 
57. Stuntz, supra note 49, at 539 (“The Fourth Amendment requires that arrests be
supported by probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime.  Street stops must 
be supported by reasonable suspicion of crime. In both instances, the operative word is 
‘crime.’  If that word includes enough behavior, if crime is defined broadly enough, police 
can stop or arrest whomever they wish.”). 
58. See id. at 537-38.
59. Id. at 536-37.
60. Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 975 (2012). 
61. Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1064.
62. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 53, at 5.
63. Id.
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Perhaps the most obvious problem with excessive caseloads 
is that they prevent public defenders from fulfilling their ethical 
obligations.64  Several scholars have argued that heavy caseloads 
force public defenders to violate a number of rules of professional 
conduct.65  Most notably, a public defender repeatedly 
experiences concurrent conflicts of interest66 when he is forced to 
divide his time amongst the hundreds of clients currently assigned 
to him.67  The conflict of interest does not necessarily arise out of 
the fact that a defender’s clients will have competing interests but 
rather that the defender is not able to perform his duties with the 
level of diligence68 and competence69 required of counsel.70  Of 
course, putting aside the rules of professional conduct, the United 
States Supreme Court has made it clear that “the ‘Assistance of 
Counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that 
such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order 
requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent 
conflicting interests.”71  Yet, despite the clear instructions laid 
down by both the rules of professional conduct and the Supreme 
Court, public defenders repeatedly find themselves forced to 
choose which clients will receive effective legal assistance.72 
64. LEFSTEIN, supra note 23, at 27.
65. Id.; Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon’s Promise by Viewing Excessive
Caseloads as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 442-48 (2012). 
66. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if “there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client . . . .”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2016). 
67. Anderson, supra note 65, at 443.
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A
lawyer’s work load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.”). 
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the 
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”). 
70. LEFSTEIN, supra note 23, at 27-29.
71. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
72. See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING 
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 69 (2009), http:// 
www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AEK-
8V5D] [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED] (quoting Missouri State Public Defender Deputy 
Director). 
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B. The Impossibility of Funding 
Increasing funding for public defense is not a politically 
feasible solution.  In fact, state legislatures have exacerbated the 
problem by continuing to cut public defense budgets despite 
constantly rising caseloads.73 The problem is twofold.  First, 
funding amongst prosecution and defense functions is heavily 
slanted in favor of prosecution and law enforcement.74  Second, 
the political reality is that most Americans and their elected 
representatives are unwilling to spend money to help “criminals” 
avoid punishment.75 
1. Funding Gaps
There is a large disparity in the funding and staffing of 
prosecutors’ offices and defense offices across the nation.  The 
American Bar Association has noted that national standards 
specify that in the pursuit of fairness, government spending on 
prosecution and indigent defense functions should be 
equivalent.76  Former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno was a 
strong proponent of this view arguing that the strength of the 
entire criminal justice system depends on the strength and 
adequacy of each “leg” of the system including indigent 
defense.77 
The current system is not as fair as Janet Reno or the national 
guidelines would call for.  The most recent national census 
conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that in 2007, 
73. See id. at 68.
74. See infra Part I.B.1.
75. See infra Part I.B.2.
76.  AM. BAR ASS’N, BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL 
JUSTICE 13 (2004), http:/ /texaswcl.tamu.edu /reports /2004_ ABA_ Gideon’s_ Broken_ 
Promise.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX4M-2KBN].  
77. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE NAT’L 
SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE: IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH 
EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS xiii (1999) (“My experiences 
as a prosecutor and as Attorney General have taught me just how important it is for every 
leg of the criminal justice system to stand strong. Indigent defense is an equally essential 
element of the criminal justice process, one which should be appropriately structured and 
funded and operating with effective standards . . . . When the conviction of a defendant is 
challenged on the basis of inadequate representation, the very legitimacy of the conviction 
itself is called into question. Our criminal justice system is interdependent: if one leg of the 
system is weaker than the others, the whole system will ultimately falter.”).  
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state prosecutors’ budgets nationwide were $5.8 billion.78  
Conversely, state and local public defender offices operated on a 
budget of only $2.3 billion in 2007.79  Additionally, state 
prosecutors’ offices enjoyed approximately 25,000 attorneys and 
25,000 support staff80 compared to the 15,000 attorneys and 
10,000 support staff employed by defenders’ offices.81  If the 
inequality were not apparent enough, it is certainly worth noting 
that the figures for prosecutors’ offices are indeed undervalued.  
The 2007 Census of State Court Prosecutors excluded offices of 
municipal attorneys or county attorneys who appear in lower 
courts of limited jurisdiction.82  Those previously mentioned 
figures, which already greatly exceeded the resources of 
defenders’ offices, do not totally account for the full amount of 
prosecution expenditures. 
States cannot dismiss the inequality in funding as a symptom 
of budgetary shortfalls because the federal government offers 
grants to help fund criminal justice efforts at the state level.83  One 
grant, the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 
Program, gave states $287 million in 2012 to go toward criminal 
justice purposes.84  States award more than 60% of those funds to 
law enforcement and only a small portion to prosecutors and 
defenders.85  However, even within that small amount there is 
approximately a 7 to 1 ratio between funding given to prosecutors 
and funding given to defenders.86 
It may be argued that excessive caseloads weigh down the 
entire criminal justice system.  After all, if public defenders are 
having to defend so many cases, obviously the prosecutors are 
having to push those cases forward in the first place.  However, 
78. STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (Dec. 2011), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/L69E-CGF4]. 
79. LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007-STATISTICAL TABLES, Table 1 (Jun. 22, 
2010), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdo07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/53DL-WRDH]. 
80. PERRY & BANKS, supra note 78, at 4 tbl.2.
81. LANGTON & FAROLE, JR., supra note 79, at 2.
82. PERRY & BANKS, supra note 78, at 1.
83. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 53, at 4.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (noting that in 2010, states allocated $13.8 million of grant money to
prosecutors, but only $1.9 million to public defenders). 
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the data explicitly refutes this notion that the rising tide raises all 
ships.  The public defenders’ offices are carrying the lion’s share 
of these massive caseloads.  Prosecutors’ offices across the nation 
receive more than two-and-a-half times as much funding as 
defenders’ offices.  The “assembly-line,” “McJustice” form of 
criminal justice that has developed does not weigh on prosecutors 
in the same manner that it cripples public defenders. 
2. Political Landscape
There is little public support for increasing indigent defense 
funding.87  “Television and the media, along with strict anti-crime 
policies, have all contributed to the public perception that 
individuals who commit crimes are dangerous ‘others’ not 
deserving of any protection.”88  The political hostility to 
strengthening indigent defense is not a new phenomenon.  During 
a hearing on the crisis of indigent defense funding held during the 
1982 Annual Conference of the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association, one witness eloquently summarized the political 
landscape acknowledging that there is “no popular solution” to 
indigent defense funding because helping criminal defendants is 
not a high priority for the public.89  Over thirty years later, a 
popular solution has yet to emerge. 
The political process is heavily slanted against indigent 
defendants through systemic disenfranchisement.  “Indigent 
defendants represent the archetypical ‘discrete and insular 
87. For a general discussion of the political backlash to effective representation of
criminal defendants, see Gideon’s Promise, supra note 8, at 2066-68. 
88. Thompson, supra note 10, at 714-15.
89. AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING
15-16 (1982), https://www.americanbar.org /content /dam /aba /administrative / 
legal_aid_indigent_defendants/downloads/indigentdefense/gideonundone.authcheckdam.p
df [https://perma.cc/54UH-WMGC] (“There is no popular solution to this question of 
indigent defense funding . . . . People are sick and tired of paying for programs they don’t 
believe in . . . . Today, the indigent defendant in Massachusetts faces a system that’s 
determined to arrange for his arrest, provide for his prosecution and require his incarceration 
if convicted. There is less determination to pay any money for his effective representation in 
court. The legislature is faced with a shortage of funds. It’s a question of priority as to which 
programs are going to get funded. A program for funding the representation of a man that’s 
accused of breaking into your house is not going to go through . . . . What I’m asking you all 
here today as members of the bar is to realize this is a very very unpopular subject. There is 
no public support whatsoever . . . . Legislators in a democracy have to be elected. We can’t 
expect much support from them. The last line of defense rests with the bar.”). 
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minority’ . . . .”90  People accused of crimes are generally 
removed from the political process because they usually come 
from “poor and alienated” social groups or they have legally been 
disenfranchised because of a felony conviction.91  What results is 
that legislators must respond to the general electorate which 
demands that politicians be “tough on crime;” meanwhile, the 
unpopular and silent constituency of criminal defendants 
continues to go ignored.92 
A great example of how public defense is seen not as a 
constitutional mandate but rather as yet another agency seeking 
public funds is illustrated in Missouri’s fight between former 
Governor Jay Nixon and Michael Barrett, the director of 
Missouri’s public defender system.93  In 2014, Barrett presented 
the Missouri General Assembly with empirical evidence based 
partly on tracking Missouri defenders’ time usage that showed 
Missouri public defenders were unable to devote as much time to 
their cases as prevailing professional norms would suggest.94  For 
example, for noncapital murder cases, Missouri defenders 
reported spending an average of 84.5 hours per case whereas 
experts suggested the professional norm would be 106.6 hours.95 
Persuaded by the empirical evidence, the Missouri General 
Assembly approved a $3.47 million funding increase for the 
Missouri Public Defender’s Office.96  However, Governor Jay 
Nixon vetoed the legislation, and although his veto was 
overridden, he simply refused to distribute the funds.97  When the 
90. Drinan, supra note 13, at 430.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Katie Reilly, Missouri’s Governor Cut Funding to the State’s Public
Defenders. So They Assigned Him a Case, TIME.COM (Aug. 4, 2016), http://time.com 
/4439083/missouri-public-defender-governor-jay-nixon/ [https://perma.cc/29DA-FG7L]. 
94. AM. BAR ASS’N, THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC 
DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 23-24 (2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org /content /dam /aba /events /legal _ aid_indigent_ defendants 
/2014 /ls_sclaid_5c_the_missouri_project_report. authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
JC8T -BN5W]. 
95. Id.
96. See Dylan Walsh, On the Defensive, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 2, 2016), https:/
/www.theatlantic.com /politics /archive /2016 /06 /on-the-defensive /485165 / 
[https://perma.cc/4D6A-JSVH]. 
97. See id.; Lorelei Laird, Starved of Money for Too Long, Public Defender Offices are 
Suing – and Starting to Win, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 1, 2017), http:// www.abajournal.com 
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next fiscal year rolled around, Governor Nixon actually cut the 
budget of the public defender’s office by $3.47 million, the same 
amount as the original increase.98  The Governor then approved 
$4 million for State Fairground improvements, $52 million for a 
new state park, and a staggering $998 million for a new football 
stadium.99  While the Missouri General Assembly accepted 
Barret’s empirical evidence that his office was not fulfilling its 
constitutional obligations to its clients, Governor Nixon saw the 
office as merely another agency simply competing for a piece of 
the state budget.100  As long as indigent defense is viewed in this 
way, funding will never be adequately supplied because “helping 
criminals” is just not as popular of a cause as football stadiums or 
state parks. 
3. Structural Litigation
Realizing the political process is unfavorable to criminal 
defendants, advocates have begun to turn to the courts, claiming 
the structural inadequacies in public defense deprived indigent 
defendants of the right to effective assistance of counsel.101  
Structural lawsuits claim that the manner in which states are 
choosing to fulfill the mandate from Gideon to provide indigent 
defendants with counsel still falls short of the additional 
requirement set forth in Strickland that defendants have access to 
effective assistance of counsel.102  Claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel under Strickland require a defendant to show (1) that 
his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) the defendant was prejudiced as a result of 
such deficiency.103  The general argument is that when states 
/magazine /article/the_gideon_revolution/ [https://perma.cc/MR6W-Y7H2] (noting this was 
legal under state law because revenues did not match projections). 
98. Walsh, supra note 96.
99. Id.
100.  See Reilly, supra note 93. 
101.  For an excellent summary of structural litigation, see generally Drinan, supra 
note 13. 
102.  See id. at 432-33. 
103.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). It is important to note that 
many scholars have criticized Strickland as being “toothless” and a meaningless standard. 
See Drinan, supra note 22, at 1318; George C. Thomas III, When Lawyers Fail Innocent 
Defendants: Exorcising the Ghosts that Haunt the Criminal Justice Systems, 2008 UTAH L. 
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force public defenders to represent too many clients at once, 
individual clients fail to receive the proper guidance required of 
counsel.104 
However, legal scholars have begun to comment that the era 
of structural litigation is “waning” despite the fact that there have 
been some success stories for defendants in such suits.105  There 
are two major problems that prevent reliance on structural 
litigation as the solution to the indigent defense crisis. 
First, public defenders are often not insulated from political 
pressures, and that lack of independence prevents defender 
offices from challenging the status quo for fear of retaliation such 
as being fired or having their budgets cut.106  Norman Lefstein 
begins his book Securing Reasonable Caseloads with the story of 
“Pat,” an assistant public defender who realized he was 
ineffective because of his caseloads.  Pat asked his superiors 
about seeking to withdraw from some of his cases, but Pat was 
informed that he lacked authority to file a motion to withdraw and 
requesting such authority would result in his termination.107  
When caseloads become unmanageable, leadership in defender 
offices are hesitant to seek withdrawal from new cases or decline 
further appointment because of fear that the elected officials they 
ultimately answer to will either have them fired108 or completely 
REV. 25, 43 (discussing the “foggy mirror” test and stating, “[i]f you place a mirror in front 
of defense counsel during trial and it fogs, counsel is in fact effective.”). 
104.  The prejudice standard under Strickland is relaxed in conflict of interest claims.  
Where an actual conflict exists, such as through joint representation, the defendant only 
needs to show an “adverse effect” which is easier to satisfy than “prejudice.”  See generally 
Anderson, supra note 65, at 438-42. 
105.  Drinan, supra note 22, at 1330-31. But see Eve Brensike Primus, Structural 
Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 679, 706 (2007) (arguing that making structural changes to how 
ineffective assistance claims are brought could help defendants bring more claims and 
receive more favorable review from appellate courts). 
106.  See Lorelei Laird, When Public Defenders Become Plaintiffs, ABA JOURNAL 
(Jan. 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/when_public _defenders_become 
_plaintiffs/the_gideon_revolution (quoting David Carroll of the Sixth Amendment Center in 
Boston stating, “You’re very rarely going to see a public defender system bring a lawsuit 
. . . . Unless that system has independence, they’re always going to be afraid to sort of stick 
their head above the bunker.”); see also Backus & Marcus, supra note 11, at 1069-72 
(discussing the lack of independence for many defender offices). 
107.  LEFSTEIN, supra note 23, at 2-3. 
108.  Id. at 22. 
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disband the office of the public defender and privatize the 
system.109 
Second, there is doubt about the effectiveness of structural 
litigation as a strategy.110  One structural litigation commenter 
soberly explains that these suits are very expensive and often fail 
to actually improve the plight of public defenders and their clients 
even in spite of favorable decisions by the courts.111  Ultimately, 
the problem lies in enforcement because even if a court holds that 
funding for indigent defense is constitutionally inadequate, the 
legislature has to willingly increase funding for indigent defense, 
and proponents of indigent defense will still have to fight for that 
funding each year as the budget is decided.112  Appeals to the 
courts are unreliable solutions to the problems of indigent 
defense.113  Advocates of indigent defense cannot expect to 
receive help from the courts as long as indigent defendants remain 
unpopular.114 
* * * 
The Brennan Center for Justice has put forth three 
recommendations on how to best reform indigent defense in 
America: (1) removing certain low-level crimes from the criminal 
justice network; (2) increasing funding for public defense; and (3) 
increasing the effectiveness of defenders by increasing training 
and providing social worker support staff.115  However, as noted 
above, state legislatures and the public at large, are generally 
unreceptive to calls to increase spending on “criminals.” 
Increasing funding through any means is not likely to gain any 
109.  Laird, supra note 97. 
110.  Drinan, supra note 22, at 1331-32. 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. at 1332 (“Judicial victories still require legislative funding to breathe life into 
the court’s holding – funding that must be fought for annually and funding that, history tells 
us, will be inadequate. There is simply little money to be had in many jurisdictions, and 
legislators may rationally choose to spend it on issues other than indigent defense – whether 
that choice is constitutional or not.”). 
113.  But see Laird, supra note 97 (discussing several recent systemic lawsuits that 
have received favorable dispositions for defenders or indigent defendants). 
114.  Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 122-23 (2012) 
(arguing that indigent defense advocates will never receive support from the courts until a 
“political identity” is established that will capture the courts’ sympathies). 
115.  GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 53, at 8-9. 
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political momentum as long as politicians can accuse one another 
of being “soft on crime.”  Therefore, only a “supply and demand” 
solution is available.116  Increasing the “supply” of public 
defenders or increasing their effectiveness both require input by 
the state.  Increased training is not without expense.  For that 
reason alone, increased training, hiring more assistants and 
investigators, or investing in specialized education programs are 
no more feasible as solutions than the primary request of asking 
for more funding.  A supply side solution will not work. 
The remaining option is to reduce the caseloads of public 
defenders on the front end.  There are competing approaches for 
how to reduce the caseloads of defenders.  One option is to reduce 
the right to counsel for misdemeanors so that defenders can focus 
on more serious felony offenses.117  Another option is to do the 
exact opposite.118  Some have argued that defense rationing 
should be skewed in favor of misdemeanors in an attempt to crash 
the system.119  If defenders focus their resources on litigating 
misdemeanors rather than letting the hasty plea bargaining system 
decide everything, then the strain on the courts would force 
prosecutors, police officers, and legislators to decriminalize low 
level crimes.120  As the analysis to follow explains, the most 
politically viable option is to seek official decriminalization at the 
legislative level – a strategy which is growing increasingly 
popular in the political arena.121 
116.  Dripps, supra note 114, at 123-31 (comparing alternative solutions such as 
reducing the “demand” for public defenders by limiting the caseloads of defenders or 
increasing the “supply” of representation such as by allowing representation by lay persons 
or making public defense a new type of career path separate in licensing and training from 
traditional legal education). 
117.  See generally Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461 (2007). 
118.  Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1089, 1099-1100 (2013). 
119.  Id. 
120.  Id. (“More misdemeanor trials, or fewer guilty pleas at an early court appearance, 
would impose serious strain on the criminal justice system.  If these costs filter down, 
prosecutors would be forced to decline prosecution in more cases.  This may, in turn, affect 
law enforcement, potentially leading the police to exercise discretion in deciding whom they 
actually put through the system.  Finally, making the system bear more of the true costs of 
adjudicating misdemeanor arrests would, hopefully, give legislators a concrete reason (and 
perhaps some political coverage) to decriminalize and to refrain from creating more minor 
criminal offenses.”). 
121.  Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1069. 
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II. DEFINING DECRIMINALIZATION
Misdemeanor decriminalization, in whatever form, has 
increasingly been considered as a politically feasible solution to 
the indigent defense crisis.122  Defendants, the state, and the 
system all seem to come out on top from decriminalization 
efforts.123  Defendants are able to escape the burdens of the 
criminal justice apparatus including stigma and the collateral 
consequences that come from a criminal record.124  The State 
consequentially can generally expect decriminalization efforts to 
serve as an effective cost-saving measure.125  The system as a 
whole also reaps the rewards because decriminalization can 
reduce the burdens of mass incarceration and help soothe racial 
disparities.126  However, it is imperative to have some sort of 
working definition of what exactly “decriminalization” is, and 
what it is not. 
Scholars differ as to how decriminalization should be 
conceptualized and categorized.127  Professor Alexandra Natapoff 
argues that there are three categories when discussing 
decriminalization.128  First, there is a distinction between the 
terms “decriminalization” and “legalization.”129  Legalization is a 
complete “roll-back” of the state’s regulatory authority for certain 
activities, but decriminalization is focused on either reducing or 
eliminating criminal sanctions for conduct that is still 
regulated.130  Second, decriminalization itself can be broken 
down into two different forms.131  “Full decriminalization” takes 
place when an offense is completely removed from the criminal 
context and reclassified as a civil offense.132  “Partial 
decriminalization” occurs when an offense remains criminal in 
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. at 1071-77.  
124.  Id. at 1071-72. 
125.  Id. at 1072-74. 
126.  Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1074-77. 
127.  Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic 
Stops, 62 UCLA L. REV. 672, 675 (2015) (listing several different conceptions of 
“decriminalization” among legal scholars). 
128.  Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1065-67. 
129.  Id. at 1066. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. at 1067. 
132.  Id.  
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nature, but the possibility of imprisonment is removed as a 
punishment.133 
For the purposes of this comment, I will adopt a competing 
framework of decriminalization that identifies four separate 
strategies for decriminalization efforts: substitution, de facto 
decriminalization, pure decriminalization, and reclassification.134  
Each strategy comes with its own separate benefits and costs.135  
If society is to adopt a policy, it needs to be able to fully apprise 
the expected gains and consequences of that path of action before 
acting. 
Substitution involves replacing criminal sanctions with non-
punitive responses as illustrated through drug courts and other 
diversion strategies.136  De facto decriminalization arises when 
police and prosecutors simply choose not to enforce certain 
offenses due to budget constraints or moral opposition to the 
law.137  Pure decriminalization can also be titled legalization, 
where all legal regulation of a conduct is lifted.138  Lastly, 
reclassification involves shifting an offense from the criminal 
realm to the civil realm, where the conduct is still regulated and 
discouraged, but criminal penalties are replaced with civil 
fines.139 
Substitution efforts such as drug courts have been highly 
praised as an invaluable tool to divert non-violent drug offenders 
away from incarceration and toward treatment.140  However, 
diversion efforts have been criticized for focusing solely on the 
sanction aspect of criminalization and still leaving individuals, 
133.  Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1067.  
134.  Woods, supra note 127, at 683. 
135.  Id. at 683-96 (discussing four separate ways states have approached 
decriminalization). 
136.  Id. at 683-84. 
137.  Id. at 686-89 (noting however, de facto decriminalization raises several serious 
concerns about inconsistent, selective enforcement of laws against unpopular minorities). 
138.  Id. at 689; Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1065. 
139.  See Woods, supra note 127, at 693; see also Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1067 
(defining this strategy as “full decriminalization”). 
140.  See The Hon. Seth W. Norman et. al., Drug Court Success: Outcomes and Cost 
Savings of an Innovative Residential Drug Court Treatment Program for Felony Offenders, 
TENN. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 1, 2015) (“A significant body of literature has been developed to 
suggest that drug courts are effective, particularly at reducing recidivism and containing 
costs. Meta-analyses comparing the outcomes of multiple drug courts have found significant 
reductions in crime and recidivism for program participants.”). 
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particularly within minority communities, subject to 
stigmatization and other harms from overpolicing.141 
De facto decriminalization serves as a way for law 
enforcement officials to exercise their discretion and avoid the 
strict penalties the law may call for if the official believes the 
sanctions are disproportionate to the reality of the offense.142  
However, decriminalizing offenses purely through law 
enforcement discretion poses a risk of “inconsistent, selective, 
and discriminatory enforcement of criminal laws.”143 
Full legalization obviously presents the greatest benefit for 
those who might traditionally be subject to regulation.  Once a 
conduct is legalized,144 there is nothing for the state to regulate, 
so the interaction between the citizen and the government should 
be eliminated.  However, legalization is limited in its application 
because certain conduct will always need to be regulated and 
restricted in some manner.  For example, driving while 
intoxicated needs to be regulated in some form.  Even if the 
offense is considered civil rather than criminal,145 there are 
certainly robust state interests in public safety that require state 
control over the conduct in some form. 
Lastly, reclassification offers the benefit of removing 
criminal sanctions for certain conduct while still providing the 
state the power to regulate the behavior.  This approach is a 
middle-ground short of legalization that may appease those who 
are strongly opposed to lessening restrictions on certain 
141.  Woods, supra note 127, at 683-86. 
142.  Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
785, 802-06 (2012) (discussing examples of “prosecutorial decriminalization” such as 
treating minor possession of marijuana as a civil offense, failing to strictly enforce three-
strike laws, or not prosecuting teens engaged in sexting for child pornography offenses). 
143.  Woods, supra note 127, at 687; Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 
(2001) (holding that a police officer may arrest an individual when he has probable cause 
that the individual has committed a crime, even if the crime suspected is a minor one such 
as failing to wear a seatbelt). For a related criticism that underenforcement of the criminal 
law has a discriminatory effect and undermines respect for the legal system, see generally 
Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715 (2006). 
144.  The term “legalized” here means that there is no regulation expressly prohibiting 
conduct rather than a law affirmatively stating that conduct is now legal. 
145.  Wisconsin is the only state in the nation where the first offense for drunk driving 
(termed Operating While Intoxicated) is not a criminal offense.  WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 346.63, 
346.65(2) (West 2017). 
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conduct.146  However, the shortcoming of reclassification is that 
reclassifying an offense as a “civil” offense does not eliminate the 
risk of abuse or stigmatization by the police.147 
No individual strategy of decriminalization is a “one size fits 
all” solution.  Each approach has its own strengths and 
weaknesses.  This is a good thing because flexibility is needed 
when deciding upon a policy.  As explained below, some 
strategies will work better for certain offenses than they will for 
others.  The best strategy is dependent upon careful consideration 
of the specific conduct targeted for decriminalization. 
III. HOW DECRIMINALIZING MARIJUANA
POSSESSION AND DRIVING WITH A SUSPENDED 
LICENSE CAN HELP 
Marijuana possession and driving with a suspended license 
are prime candidates for decriminalization within the context of 
this comment because of the disproportionate share of 
misdemeanor dockets which these offenses make up and the 
relative feasibility of removing these offenses from the criminal 
system.148  Because different jurisdictions give different crimes 
different titles, working definitions should be established for the 
crimes being discussed here. 
First, the term “marijuana offenses” should be read as simple 
possession.149  Drug trafficking is an altogether separate type of 
crime from simple drug use with different political and economic 
146.  See Kaitlin C. Gratton, Note, Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: 
Reclassifying Drug Possession Offenses in Response to the Indigent Defense Crisis, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1039, 1042 n. 9 (2012) (specifically using the term “reclassification” rather 
than “decriminalization” in order to avoid negative connotations associated with 
decriminalization so as to not alienate readers opposed to reducing the scope of prohibited 
behavior). 
147.  See infra Part III.C discussing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008). 
148.  ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS 
COULD SAVE $1 BILLION PER YEAR: REDUCING THE NEED FOR AND COST OF APPOINTED 
COUNSEL 2-3 (2010), http:// www.acslaw. org/ sites /default /files /Boruchowitz_-_ 
Misdemeanors.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC3M-5VKV]. 
149.  Unfortunately, a precise or shared definition of “simple possession” is virtually 
nonexistent because there is large disagreement among states about whether marijuana 
possession should be a felony or a misdemeanor in the first place and what amount of 
marijuana transforms misdemeanor possession to felony possession.  Compare MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 579.015 (West 2017) (making it a felony to possess thirty-five grams or more 
marijuana), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-419 (2016) (requiring four ounces or more of 
marijuana to establish felony possession). 
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pressures.  This comment is limited to removing possession of 
marijuana from the criminal realm, but the problems of 
distribution, manufacturing, and transportation of marijuana 
remain for others to address. 
Second, clarity is also necessary when discussing “driving 
with a suspended license.”150  Specifically, the primarily targeted 
offense is the offense of driving with a suspended license when 
the underlying suspension is based on the inability or failure to 
pay some other fine or fee.  Arguments can be made that the 
sanctions related to the suspension of driver’s licenses for other 
reasons such as driving while intoxicated are also too severe and 
should be decriminalized to some extent.151  However, the 
political reality is that licenses suspended based on unpaid fines 
carry a separate level of culpability and risk to society than 
licenses suspended based on reckless driving.152  Therefore, the 
politically feasible option would be to limit the discussion to 
driving with a suspended license based on unpaid fines or fees 
and leave suspensions based on other reasons for future 
discussions. 
It is appropriate to consider the separate crimes of marijuana 
possession and driving on a suspended license simultaneously 
because each crime represents a substantial share of the 
misdemeanor docket, and each offense carries a separate type of 
culpability with one being the use of an illicit substance for a 
psychological effect and the other being a resistance to 
administrative controls and safety regulations.  A marijuana user 
is illegally consuming a product with the hope to achieve some 
psycho-active, hallucinogenic effect.  An unauthorized driver is 
ignoring an administrative or adjudicatory determination that the 
individual is not fit to operate a motor vehicle.  The former is a 
drug crime, and the latter is a traffic violation.  Normatively, these 
150.  Driving with a suspended license can be criminalized in many forms.  For 
example, the offense exists in three separate statutes in the state of Arkansas.  ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-65-105 (2016) (suspension for drunk driving); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-303 
(2014 & Supp. 2017) (general statute for suspended license based on traffic history); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 27-19-304 (2014) (specialty provision with limited application for the Motor 
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act). 
151.  E.g., in Arkansas, driving on a suspended license related to driving while 
intoxicated results in a mandatory minimum of ten days imprisonment. ARK. CODE ANN. § 
5-65-105 (2016). 
152.  See MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at n. 118 (noting suspensions based on driving 
history can be viewed as a public safety issue). 
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offenses carry separate levels of culpability and moral 
stigmatization.  This distinction is important when considering 
what policy options are available for each offense. 
A. Share of Misdemeanor Dockets 
Marijuana possession and driving with a suspended license 
have a substantial impact on misdemeanor caseloads across the 
nation.  In some jurisdictions, driving with a suspended license, 
possession of marijuana, and minor in possession of alcohol cases 
can make up between 40% to 50% of misdemeanor caseloads.153  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to be completely accurate when 
describing the “data” of misdemeanors because of problems with 
underreporting154 and ambiguity with how crimes are classified 
and reported.155  Even with these problems, there is still some 
reliable data illustrating the burdens marijuana possession and 
driving with a suspended license cases put on courts. 
In Texas, drug offenses make up 20% of the entire 
misdemeanor criminal docket, and over three-fourths of those 
153.  BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 148, at 1. 
154.  Natapoff, supra note 30, at 1321 (“[T]his arena is plagued by underreporting.”). 
155.  Woods, supra note 127, at 743 and accompanying text.  What is misdemeanor 
simple possession in Arkansas is reported as felony possession of a controlled substance in 
Missouri.  Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 579.015 (West 2017) (making it a felony to possess 
thirty-five grams or more marijuana) with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-419 (2016) (requiring 
four ounces or more of marijuana to establish felony possession). In Missouri, what might 
otherwise be considered simple possession of marijuana is categorically thrown in with 
felony possession of a controlled substance, so it is impossible to look at caseload data in 
Missouri and actually figure out how many of the reported felony possession cases actually 
involve simple possession cases.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 579.015 (West 2017).  Because states 
are free to choose how to classify and penalize marijuana possession, it is impossible in some 
circumstances to look at a reported conviction and determine if the underlying conduct was 
merely possession of a small amount of marijuana or something more serious such as 
trafficking.  See Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1058; see generally Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 
U.S. 184, 206 (2013) (holding it is impossible to determine if a conviction under Georgia 
law for “possession with intent to distribute” actually required proof of more than simple 
possession to qualify the conviction as an aggravated felony for immigration proceedings).  
In Moncrieffe, the defendant had pled guilty to felony possession with intent to distribute for 
having 1.3 grams, or two to three cigarettes, of marijuana in his car.  Id. at 188.  This is a 
perfect example of the dilemma of identifying “simple possession” data.  The defendant was 
in possession of an extremely small amount of marijuana, but Georgia will report his 
conviction as felony trafficking of a controlled substance.  Id.  For empirical purposes, 
identifying hard numbers of marijuana possession prosecutions is extremely difficult given 
the wide variation in how states classify and report crimes.  
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drug cases are possession of marijuana cases,156 meaning 
possession of marijuana makes up approximately 15% of the 
entire misdemeanor criminal docket in the state of Texas.157  In 
New York City, criminal possession of marijuana in the 5th 
degree158 has decreased in charging frequency, but still remains 
one of the most frequently charged offenses at arraignment.159  In 
2010, 5th degree possession was the number one most frequently 
charged misdemeanor offense with a little more than 40,000 total 
charges out of 272,400 total misdemeanors, but by 2015, 5th 
degree possession fell to being only the sixth most frequently 
charged misdemeanor in New York City with only approximately 
15,000 total charges out of 222,579 total misdemeanors.160  In 
Missouri, misdemeanor possession of marijuana made up at 
least161 approximately 14% of all drug related prosecutions and 
approximately 9% of the entire misdemeanor docket in Fiscal 
Year 2015.162  Misdemeanor possession was the twelfth most 
156.  In Texas, possession of less than four ounces is a misdemeanor. TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.121 (West 2017). 
157.  OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE 
TEXAS JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1308021/ 
2015-ar-statistical-print.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLK3-JGGF]. 
158.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2017) (criminalizing possession of 
marijuana in public and the marijuana is burning or open to public view or possessing 
substances containing marijuana with an aggregate weight of more than twenty-five grams). 
159.  OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT, CRIMINAL 
COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: ANNUAL REPORT 2015 29-30 (2016). 
160.  Id. at 25, 29. 
161.  It is impossible to tell how many additional incidents of possession were 
prosecuted as felony distribution or felony possession.  This is especially true since passing 
a marijuana cigarette to a friend is felony distribution in Missouri.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 
195.211 (West 2017) (felony distribution or delivery of less than five grams of marijuana).  
The actual percentage of simple possession cases in Missouri is likely higher than calculated.  
162.  There were 1,335 charges filed at the circuit level for violations of MO. REV. 
STAT. § 195.202(3) (West 2016) (possession of up to thirty-five grams of marijuana).  
OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, MISSOURI JUDICIARY CRIMINAL SYSTEM 
SELECTED DRUG CHARGES FILED AND DISPOSED: CIRCUIT LEVEL FISCAL YEAR 2015 
(2016), https:// www.nycourts.gov /COURTS / nyc /criminal /2015_ crim_ crt_ ann_ 
rpt_%20062316_fnl2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZV3-5Q3A].  There were 8,006 charges filed 
for the same offense at the associate level.  OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 
MISSOURI JUDICIARY CRIMINAL SYSTEM SELECTED DRUG CHARGES FILED AND DISPOSED: 
ASSOCIATE LEVEL FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016), https://www.courts.mo.Gov 
/file.jsp?id=100723 [https://perma.cc/44EG-EG56].  A total of 64,651 drug related charges 
were filed at both levels.  See OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, MISSOURI 
JUDICIARY CRIMINAL SYSTEM SELECTED DRUG CHARGES FILES AND DISPOSED: CIRCUIT 
LEVEL FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016), https:// www.nycourts.gov /COURTS /nyc /criminal 
/2015 _crim_crt_ann_rpt_%20062316_fnl2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZV3-5Q3A]; OFFICE OF 
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frequently charged drug offense at both the associate level and the 
circuit level.163 
Driving on a suspended license is also a heavy contributor to 
misdemeanor caseloads.  Driving on a suspended license 3rd 
degree was the fifth most frequent misdemeanor in New York 
City with slightly more than 15,000 total charges in 2015.164  In 
Little Rock, Arkansas, driving without a license or on a suspended 
license makes up approximately 12-20% of all tickets in a given 
year.165  One report found that in Grand Traverse County, 
Michigan, driving with a suspended license made up about 10% 
of all cases.166  For public defenders in the State of Washington, 
driving with a suspended license based on unpaid fines has been 
found to make up around one-third of all misdemeanors 
throughout the entire state.167  In the city of Longview, 
Washington, the public defender’s office is essentially forced to 
STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, MISSOURI JUDICIARY CRIMINAL SYSTEM SELECTED 
DRUG CHARGES FILED AND DISPOSED: ASSOCIATE LEVEL FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016), 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=100723 [https://perma.cc/44EG-EG56]. A total of 
102,003 misdemeanors were filed in the state during Fiscal Year 2015.  OFFICE OF STATE 
COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 26 CIRCUIT 
COURT, FY 2015 CRIMINAL CASES FILED, DISPOSED AND PENDING (2016), 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96415 [https://perma.cc/J3ER-2CS6]; OFFICE OF 
STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, MISSOURI JUDICIARY CRIMINAL SYSTEM SELECTED 
DRUG CHARGES FILED AND DISPOSED: ASSOCIATE LEVEL FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016), 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=100723 [https://perma.cc/ARA5-D9LH]. 
163.  OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – 
SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 19 CIRCUIT DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED 
(2016), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96452 [https://perma.cc/C798-G5TM]; 
OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 
20 ASSOCIATE DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED (2016), 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96415 [https://perma.cc/MM5E-Z5YA]. 
164.  OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT, CRIMINAL 
COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK ANNUAL REPORT 2015 29 (2016), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/criminal/2015_crim_crt_ann_rpt_%20062316_fnl
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TFJ-VH7F].
165.  Alexis Rogers, New Law Can Help Suspended Drivers Get License Back & Keep 
Money, KATV (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.katv.com/news/local/new-law-can-help-
suspended-drivers-get-license-back-keep-money [https://perma.cc/YQ9C-CLGN].  
166.  MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 26. 
167.  JOANNE I. MOORE & DAVID K. CHAPMAN, WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF 
PUBLIC DEFENSE: DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED 3RD DEGREE SURVEY OF COURTS 
OF LIMITED JURISDICTION 1 (2008), http://www. opd.wa.gov /documents/0056-
2008_DWLS3Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FJY-WHX7]; MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, 
at 29 (noting pre-filing diversion for one municipal court would reduce the defender’s 
misdemeanor caseload by 46%). 
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dedicate one of its five attorneys to work full-time on suspended 
license cases.168 
For Fiscal Year 2015 in Missouri, a first offense of driving 
with a suspended license was only punishable by a fine of 
$300,169 so public defenders did not need to be appointed to 
handle those cases.170  During that time, a total of 13,289 charges 
were filed for first offenses of driving with a suspended license.171  
If those offenses were still Class A misdemeanors punishable by 
up to a year in prison,172 the burden of public defenders would 
potentially be extended to covering an additional 13% of the 
entire misdemeanor docket.173 
B. Benefits 
There are several direct and indirect benefits that will result 
from decriminalization.  For example, the thesis of this entire 
comment is that reducing the caseloads of public defenders will 
allow public defenders to spend more time on their remaining 
cases, in theory, providing a higher level of representation than 
168.  DRIVEN TO FAIL: THE HIGH COST OF WASHINGTON’S MOST INEFFECTIVE 
CRIME – DWLS III, ACLU 9 (2017) [hereinafter DRIVEN TO FAIL]. The office is forced to 
spend $135,000 annually defending suspended license cases.  Id. 
169.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 302.321 (West 2016); H.B. 111, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2011). 
170.  See supra Part I describing the extent of the right to appointed counsel. 
171.  OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – 
SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 19 CIRCUIT DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED 
(2016), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96452 [https://perma.cc/C798-G5TM]; 
OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 
20 ASSOCIATE DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED (2016), 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96415 [https://perma.cc/MM5E-Z5YA]. 
172.  The law was amended in 2011 from a Class A misdemeanor to a fine only offense. 
See H.B. 111, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011). 
173.  See OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – 
SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 26 CIRCUIT COURT, FY 2015 CRIMINAL CASES FILED, DISPOSED AND 
PENDING (2016), https://www.courts.mo.gov /file.jsp?id=96415 [https://perma.cc/J3ER-
2CS6] (There were a total of 102,003 misdemeanors filed in fiscal year 2015.); OFFICE OF 
STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 19 
CIRCUIT DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED (2016), 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96452 [https://perma.cc/C798-G5TM]; OFFICE OF 
STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT – SUPPLEMENT: TABLE 20 
ASSOCIATE DIVISIONS, FY 2015: TOP FIFTY STATE CHARGES FILED (2016), 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=96415 [https://perma.cc/MM5E-Z5YA]. 
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would be permitted under the current caseloads.174  In Texas, the 
decriminalization of marijuana would remove the need to appoint 
counsel for 15% of the entire misdemeanor docket.175  When 
Missouri decriminalized driving with a suspended license, it 
successfully avoided having to provide counsel for 13% of its 
misdemeanor docket.176  Given that approximately 80% of all 
criminal defendants are eligible for public representation,177 
reducing caseloads overall will certainly have a substantial impact 
on relieving the caseloads of public defenders. 
In addition, there are collateral benefits that can be expected. 
Depending on the decriminalization strategy adopted, the 
collateral consequences of a misdemeanor conviction could be 
eliminated or reduced.  Misdemeanors carry harsh collateral 
consequences that follow misdemeanants around affecting 
employment prospects, restricting voting rights, eliminating 
eligibility for loans or public benefits, and causing other 
stigmatizing harms.178  Reducing an individual’s exposure to the 
misdemeanor process by decriminalizing his conduct can prevent 
the individual from being convicted in the first place and having 
those collateral consequences attach. 
Furthermore, the entire criminal justice system can benefit 
financially from decriminalizing marijuana possession and 
driving on a suspended license.  One report estimated that nation-
wide decriminalization of marijuana possession and driving on a 
suspended license could save over $2 billion.179  Another report 
calculated the costs to prosecute a single charge of marijuana 
possession range from $1,577 to as high as $7,000 resulting in 
statewide annual expenditures on marijuana possession arrests 
174.  Contra David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The 
Rhetoric and the Reality, 32 LAW & INEQ. 371, 385 (2014) (arguing that reforms that reduce 
caseloads of public defenders would have no impact because state legislatures would 
accordingly reduce funding for defense services as caseloads decline). 
175.  See ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 
2015 (2015), supra note 157, at 1. 
176.  See BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 148 (13,289 charges filed for first offense driving 
with a suspended license divided by 102,003 total misdemeanors filed equals approximately 
13%). 
177.  Primus, supra note 105, at 687-88; cf. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 53 
(“[R]esearchers estimate that anywhere from 60 to 90 percent of criminal defendants need 
publicly-funded attorneys, depending on the jurisdiction.”). 
178.  Natapoff, supra note 30, at 1323-27; Roberts, supra note 20, at 297-303. 
179.  BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 148, at 4. 
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and adjudication anywhere between $78 million to $364 
million.180  In Missouri, the legalization of marijuana would not 
only eliminate the need to appoint counsel in 9% of all 
misdemeanor cases, but the state would no longer need to spend 
over $49 million enforcing marijuana possession laws.181  
Driving with a suspended license is also burdensome to enforce. 
One report estimates the expense of prosecuting a single case of 
driving with a suspended license to range from $568 to $1,107.182  
The state of Washington spent approximately $42 million 
enforcing driving with a suspended license charges in 2015.183 
Another collateral benefit of the legalization or 
decriminalization of certain minor crimes may arise in the form 
of increased racial equality.  Legalizing possession of marijuana 
is one example of where racial disparities in the criminal justice 
system might be softened.  The American Civil Liberties Union 
looked at national arrest data for 2010 and found that across the 
nation, African Americans were 3.73 times more likely to be 
arrested for marijuana possession than white individuals.184  At 
the individual state level, the African American arrest rate grew 
as high as 8.34 times more likely to be arrested than whites at the 
top of the spectrum and still remained more than double the arrest 
rate of whites at the lowest end of the spectrum.185  If marijuana 
is legalized in a state, then the police have no authority to arrest 
anyone for that activity regardless of race. 
Unfortunately, suspended licenses also have a notably 
disproportionate impact on minority communities.  Seattle’s City 
Attorney reported that even though African Americans make up 
only 8% of the city’s population, they make up over 40% of all 
180.  KATHLEEN KANE-WILLIS ET AL., PATCHWORK POLICY: AN EVALUATION OF 
ARRESTS AND TICKETS FOR MARIJUANA MISDEMEANORS IN ILLINOIS 3 (2014), 
http://www.roosevelt.edu/~/media/Files/pdfs/CAS/ICDP?PatchworkPolicyFUllReport.ashx 
[http://perma.cc/2L96-QQLY].  
181.  ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: BILLIONS OF 
DOLLARS WASTED ON RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 160 (Jun. 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf [https://perma.cc/58QG-
NHEV] [hereinafter THE WAR ON MARIJUANA]. 
182.  See DRIVEN TO FAIL, supra note 168, at 8. 
183.  Id. at 9. 
184.  THE WAR ON MARIJUANA, supra note 181, at 9. 
185.  Id. at 18. 
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driving with a suspended license 3rd degree charges.186  A less 
obvious, but more insidious, form of the racial disparity 
surrounding suspended licenses is illustrated by the unacceptable 
practices in Ferguson, Missouri.  The U.S. Department of Justice 
found a system that disproportionately targets poor minorities by 
using traffic citations, ultimately leading to suspended licenses 
for inability to pay, as means to generate revenue and force a cycle 
of indebtedness to the city.187  It cannot be said that legalizing 
marijuana and decriminalizing driving on a suspended license 
would guarantee that the police no longer disproportionately 
arrest African Americans for every other crime that remains on 
the books, but it would at least reduce one source of racial 
inequality which is a step in the right direction.188 
C. Hidden Dangers 
There is, however, an unconsidered “dark side” of 
decriminalization that is often overlooked.189  Incomplete 
decriminalization efforts, such as reducing the offense to a non-
jailable misdemeanor, can be a dangerous solution because once 
the threat of imprisonment is removed from an offense, the right 
to counsel no longer attaches even though many of the same 
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction occur when the 
punishment is a mere fine.190  Furthermore, it is far too common 
that municipalities unfairly target minority populations with 
various fines and fees as a source of revenue which actually 
deepens racial divides.191  When individuals cannot afford to pay 
186.  Protecting the Constitutional Right to Counsel for Indigents Charged with 
Misdemeanors: Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 13 (2015) (testimony of 
Professor Robert C. Boruchowitz at 13).  
187.  See generally CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF 
THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T (Mar. 4, 2015). This type of systemic inequality is not unique 
to Ferguson, MO. See also LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SAN 
FRANCISCO BAY AREA, NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE 
INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 19 (2015) (finding a disproportionate impact of traffic citations 
and license suspensions among African Americans in San Francisco). 
188.  Professor Natapoff has argued that the current structure of the misdemeanor 
process has strong racial biases that have institutionalized the concept of trapping racial 
minorities in the criminal justice system and presuming guilt for minorities. See Natapoff, 
supra note 30, at 1368-72. 
189.  Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1077-93. 
190.  Id. at 1078. 
191.  Id. at 1100. 
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their fines, they may still end up in prison for failure to pay.192  
Most importantly, even though an offense may be a “nonjailable 
civil offense,” an individual may still be arrested and held in a jail 
cell.193 
While hidden risks do indeed lie in the decriminalization 
process, they are not unique to decriminalization.  It cannot be 
said that racial minorities are only disproportionately targeted 
once decriminalization occurs.  Racial minority groups have 
historically been the target of the criminal justice system in the 
first place.194  The problem with racial disparities likely lies in 
policing efforts rather than with the structure of the law itself.195  
Incarcerations for failure to pay fines can also be remedied. 
Affirmative defenses for inability to pay can easily be 
incorporated to protect indigent defendants.196  However, while 
some may argue that such affirmative defenses go ignored by 
local courts,197 that is a separate problem from the actual policy 
of decriminalization.  A court’s refusal to honor a statutory 
affirmative defense goes to deeper issues of judicial authority and 
appellate review for miscarriages of justice which is an entirely 
separate discussion. 
The strongest criticism against decriminalization is the fact 
that a nonjailable offense can still result in arrest and 
imprisonment.198  In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
upheld the six-day incarceration and strip search of a man arrested 
for the “civil” offense of contempt for failure to pay a fine, a 
nonjailable offense under applicable state law.199  What is perhaps 
the most troubling is that states seemingly lack the authority to 
limit the behavior of their police officers.  Custodial arrests for 
192.  Id. at 1081. 
193.  Id. at 1080. 
194.  Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1070. 
195.  Id. 
196.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-703(c)(1) (2010) (stating a defendant may 
show that the default was not attributable to a purposeful refusal to obey the sentence or a 
failure on behalf of the defendant to make a good-faith effort to obtain the funds to pay the 
fine). 
197.  See, e.g., Shawnya Meyers, Arkansas Cancer Patient Sent to “Debtors Prison” 
Over Bounced Checks, Spurs ACLU Lawsuit, 5NEWS (Aug. 25, 2016), 
http://5newsonline.com/2016/08/25/arkansas-cancer-patient-sent-to-debtors-prison-over-
bounced-checks-spurs-aclu-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/8ZW8-D3EL]. 
198.  See Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1079. 
199.  Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 323, 339 (2012). 
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nonjailable offenses do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even when state law 
expressly prohibits arrests in such situations.200  This is a 
frightening proposition.  A state can provide clear statutory 
guidance to police officers not to arrest individuals for certain 
minor offenses, but a police officer’s disregard of such laws is 
fine as far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned. 
The line of judicial authority granting officers the power to 
arrest and jail those charged with committing minor offenses that 
have theoretically been removed from the criminal process does 
indeed give rise for concern.  However, once again, these 
concerns speak more so to issues of local policing rather than the 
actual structures of the criminal code.201  Even though police 
officers may have the authority to arrest for decriminalized 
offenses, it is up to state legislatures to make it a priority to 
reinforce a value system among its law enforcement members that 
the exercise of such authority is not going to be tolerated.  An 
officer may not violate the Fourth Amendment when an arrest for 
a nonjailable offense is made in spite of state law, but that does 
not mean that the officer cannot violate local department protocol 
or other guidelines resulting in the officer’s discipline or 
termination.  Vigilant oversight of policing priorities by state 
legislatures is absolutely necessary in order to ensure that the 
values of a reformed criminal code are reflected in the everyday 
interactions between citizens and the law.202 
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Going forward, policy makers should be cognizant that no 
one strategy of decriminalization will be effective for every 
offense being decriminalized.  For a given offense, some 
strategies will be overly-broad and some will be under-inclusive.  
200.  Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). 
201.  See generally Woods, supra note 127 (arguing conversations of decriminalization 
should not focus exclusively on reducing sanctions but also on modifying policing of 
decriminalized offenses). 
202.  For an aggressive criticism of New York City’s police enforcement of city 
ordinances regarding behavior on the subway, such as arresting individuals for taking up 
more than one seat, see Joseph Goldstein & Christine Haughney, Relax, if You Want, but 
Don’t Put Your Feet Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2012/01/07/nyregion/minor-offense-on-ny-subway-can-bring-ticket-or-handcuffs.html 
[https://perma.cc/B7T4-84FH]. 
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The right tool needs to be chosen for the right job.  Furthermore, 
policy makers should be mindful of public sentiment when 
determining whether or not it is time to finally roll back the reach 
of the criminal law.  If legislatures are truly responsive to public 
opinion, the scope of the criminal law should ebb and flow with 
time, expanding at one time in one area and shrinking at another 
time in another area.203  Currently, public opinion calls for 
decriminalization of marijuana possession and driving with a 
suspended license. 
A. Different Solutions for Different Conduct 
Using the above-mentioned four-part framework for 
decriminalization, it is plainly obvious that not all four strategies 
are viable for both marijuana offenses and driving with a 
suspended license.  Marijuana possession can be approached 
under any one of the four methods, but driving with a suspended 
license cannot.  In fact, possession of marijuana has been tackled 
under each strategy across the nation as the states experiment with 
decriminalizing the substance.204  Some jurisdictions have chosen 
not to prosecute minor possession offenses.205  Others have 
reclassified possession of small amounts as fine-only civil 
violations.206  Some jurisdictions have even gone as far as fully 
legalizing the recreational use of marijuana.207  Any given 
strategy of decriminalization can be appropriate when discussing 
marijuana possession. 
Some of those options are not available for driving with a 
suspended license.  Pure decriminalization or legalization is never 
going to be an option for driving with a suspended license.  As 
long as the suspension of one’s driver’s license is an available 
203.  Stuntz, supra note 49, at 527-28. 
204. For an interactive map detailing state laws regarding marijuana, see 
http://norml.org/states [https://perma.cc/JC8Z-ALJK]. 
205.  Woods, supra note 127, at 687-88 (detailing how the District Attorney for Dane 
County, Wisconsin promised not to prosecute anyone possessing less than one ounce of 
marijuana). 
206.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-601(c)(2)(ii) (West 2017) (possession 
or use of less than ten grams of marijuana is a civil offense subject to a civil penalty of one 
hundred to five hundred dollars). 
207. NORML, Legalization, http:// norml.org /legal /legalization 
[https://perma.cc/QBD7-2XV5] (eight states and the District of Columbia have legalized 
recreational use of marijuana). 
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sanction, the failure to honor that sanction will be penalized itself 
in some form even if through civil fines.  In order to legalize 
driving on a suspended license, states would have to forfeit the 
power to revoke someone’s driving privileges, and that is just not 
a very wise idea in the least.  After all, some individuals are 
dangerous drivers who should not be allowed to operate motor 
vehicles for the safety of their fellow commuters.208  
Alternatively, licenses may be suspended not because the 
individual is a hazard to public safety but because the individual 
has failed to pay fines or fees such as parking tickets or even failed 
to pay child support.209  In either case, the offense of driving with 
a suspended license is the offense of not honoring a court or other 
adjudicatory order somewhat comparable to contempt. 
Legalization is not a viable option for addressing driving with a 
suspended license.  No matter what the reason is for the 
underlying suspension, the ability for the state to exercise some 
sort of regulatory control over driving privileges and being able 
to enforce those controls are important state interests that should 
be preserved. 
For the same reasons, de facto decriminalization would also 
be highly inappropriate.  What is the point of having a license if 
the actual test is whether or not the traffic officer on the scene is 
the one who gets to decide if you are fit to operate a motor 
vehicle?  If a court suspends an individual’s license for driving 
while intoxicated, and an officer chooses not to enforce that order 
when he pulls over an individual on a suspended license because 
of the officer’s moral opposition to the sanction itself, then the 
executive branch is effectively undermining the authority of the 
judicial branch.  Respect for the courts will be lost and the 
uniform administration of the law will suffer. 
Driving with a suspended license is more narrowly 
constrained to be addressed through substitution or 
reclassification.  Diversion programs have found moderate 
success in several jurisdictions.210  Those jurisdictions have 
208.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-907 (2014) (allowing the Office of Driver 
Services to suspend the license of a driver for up to one year upon a showing that the driver 
is a habitual violator of traffic laws, is a habitually reckless or negligent driver, has been 
involved in an accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another, or for other 
cause). 
209.  MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 26. 
210.  Id. at 28-29. 
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adopted relicensing programs which allow individuals to pay the 
underlying fines that caused the suspension of the license through 
a payment plan or through community service, and upon 
completion, the driving on a suspended license charge is 
dropped.211  Spokane, Washington adopted a relicensing program 
that even lifted the suspension on the participants’ licenses before 
the fines were paid as long as they were participating in the 
diversion program.212  In 2004, the King County, Washington 
program reduced driving with a suspended license prosecutions 
by 84% and actually generated revenues of $270,000 for the 
county within the first nine months of operation.213  That sort of 
impact is phenomenal. 
B. Public Sentiment 
Furthermore, the tide of history suggests it is finally time to 
remove criminal sanctions from marijuana possession and driving 
with a suspended license.  Currently, twenty-eight states have 
legalized the medicinal use of marijuana, and several others have 
allowed for the medicinal use of Cannabidiol (CBD), a non-
psychoactive extract from cannabis plants with medicinal 
properties.214  Taking things even further, eight states and the 
District of Columbia have completely decriminalized the 
recreational use of marijuana.215  Among the states where 
marijuana remains an illegal substance, four states have 
reclassified marijuana and removed jail time as a punishment for 
possessing small amounts of marijuana.216  The national trend is 
already pushing towards the decriminalization of marijuana 
possession. 
The same historical pressure exists for decriminalizing 
driving with a suspended license.  “Since 1970, twenty-two states 
211.  Id. at 28; see also BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 148, at 7-11 (summarizing and 
contrasting relicensing programs among several counties in Washington). 
212.  MINOR CRIMES, supra note 16, at 28-29. 
213.  Id. at 28. 
214. NORML, Medical Marijuana, http://norml.org /legal /medical- marijuana- 2 
[https://perma.cc/EG8Z-6XG9]. 
215. NORML, Legalization, http://norml.org /legal /legalization [https://perma.cc 
/QBD7-2XV5]. 
216. Marijuana Policy Project, State Policy, https://www.mpp.org /states / 
[https://perma.cc /GE8H-2RA2]. 
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have decriminalized the bulk of minor traffic offenses by 
removing criminal penalties and reclassifying the offenses as 
noncriminal offenses.”217  There were two primary motivations 
for the decriminalization of traffic offenses.  First, there were 
concerns that it is unfair to impose criminal sanctions for minor 
traffic offenses given “their omnipresence and lack of 
severity.”218  Second, state legislatures were driven by pragmatic 
concerns of cost-cutting because traffic violations were clogging 
court dockets, officers were forced to take time to appear in court 
to make traffic tickets “stick,” and as criminal offenses, the 
accused enjoyed the right to counsel which further exacerbated 
the expense of enforcing traffic tickets.219  However, even among 
the wave of states moving traffic violations out of the criminal 
realm, driving with a suspended license remained a criminal 
offense.220 
It is time to accept the fact that driving with a suspended 
license should be included among those traffic offenses that have 
been reclassified.  Driving with a suspended license continues to 
clog up courts and force people to spend countless days in jail 
simply because of an inability to pay pre-existing court fines and 
fees.221 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Decriminalization of minor offenses is not a perfect solution. 
Decriminalization will not definitively end racism in America. 
Decriminalization will not suddenly bring public defender 
caseloads into compliance with standards.  Decriminalization will 
not stop private citizens from being involuntarily dragged through 
the criminal justice system based on the discretion of law 
enforcement.  Decriminalization is not a perfect solution to every 
problem with the American penal system.  However, 
decriminalization is a step in the right direction. 
217.  Woods, supra note 127, at 698. 
218.  Id. at 701. 
219.  Id. at 701-02 (“Underlying these three concerns was a cost-benefit calculus 
centering on maintaining the infrastructure necessary to impose criminal sanctions.”). 
220.  Id. at 699. 
221.  See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 165 (noting one woman spent 120 days in jail 
because of unpaid fines when the individual could not afford to pay the outstanding $1,100). 
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Reducing public defender caseloads is the first step.  After 
that, it has to be ensured that state legislatures do not use reduced 
caseloads as a justification for reducing public defense funding 
and essentially undoing any benefit gained from 
decriminalization.  Also, discussions of police discretion and 
interaction with the public surrounding decriminalized offenses 
need to take place.  Ultimately, the institution of poverty needs to 
be dismantled in order to prevent so many individuals from being 
trapped in a cycle of recidivism constantly entering and leaving 
the criminal justice system.  These are all tall orders.  Some of 
them may never truly be achievable, but we have to start 
somewhere.  We have to walk before we can run. 
There is an economic reality to criminal justice that state 
legislatures must face.  States cannot continue to criminalize and 
punish behavior if the state cannot afford to enforce those 
sanctions in a way that does not run afoul of the United States 
Constitution.  The states are obligated to provide effective 
assistance of counsel for every indigent defendant facing 
imprisonment.  Currently, many states are falling short of that 
mandate.  If legislatures are unwilling to raise defense funding in 
order to provide the competent level of assistance demanded by 
the constitution, then states must realize that they cannot afford to 
strictly punish certain minor offenses.  It is time to stop the 
bleeding.  It is time to take the right to counsel seriously and 
develop a solution to the crisis of indigent defense so that justice 
can still be done. 
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